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between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and
infinitism; it proposes — and argues for — a hybrid, coherentist–
infinitist account of epistemic justification.
First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation
to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification — of
foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism — is reviewed. We
then recall recent results proving that an influential argument
against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their
incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot
be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of
Inferential Justification has rather unwelcome consequences —
formally resembling the Sorites paradox — as soon as it is iterated
and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic
inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism
and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough
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1. Introduction
Philosophical accounts of the structure of reasons and thus of
epistemic justification are typically said to fall into one of three
categories — viz. foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism. This
taxonomy of non-skeptical positions regarding epistemic justification
has been around for more than two millennia; it is closely related to
the notion of a regress of reasons and exhibits — at least historically
— a certain bias in favour of foundationalism. For, it was —
arguably! — in defense of foundationalism that Aristotle gave, in
his Posterior Analytics (Book I, Part 3) in the middle of the fourth
century BC, an early version of the regress argument: “since the
regress must end in immediate (>a´mesa) truths, those truths must be
indemonstrable (napo´deikta)” (in the translation by G.R.G. Mure
[2]; original Greek terms inserted by this author). In response to
the popular foundationalist epistemological reading of the Aristotelian
argument, infinitists would deny that there “must [be an] end” to
the regress at all, and coherentists would remark that epistemic
justification should not be conceived of as a propositional or doxastic
regress — in the sense of a linearly ordered structure of reasons — in
the first place.
Even to this very day, the threefold classification of non-skeptical
accounts of epistemic justification as foundationalist, infinitist or
coherentist enjoys widespread acceptance — so much that coherentism
is often defined, through the regress argument, simply as the third
option, as it were, of epistemic justification (cf. e.g. Spohn [61],
Bergmann [5] or the encyclopedia article by Kvanvig [40]). Within
such a presentation, coherentism is basically presented as the only
viable non-skeptical alternative to foundationalism and infinitism —
and by definition opposed to the latter two positions. As almost
everywhere in philosophy, there are also alternative views. Richard
Swinburne, for example, opines that “there is no good reason to suppose
that the various [. . . ] accounts [of epistemic justification] are in general
rival accounts, one at most of which is the true account, of a univocal
concept”. Also, Audi’s “moderate foundationalism” [3, p. 233] does not
insist on a strictly linear structure of reasons and thereby leaves room
for coherence considerations and thus for a middle ground between
coherentism and foundationalism.
In this article, we attempt to present a formal defence of the
mutual compatibility of mild versions of coherentism and infinitism,
while arguing that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism
are faced with important difficulties. First, we shall distinguish and
define different versions of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism
— and study their relation to the epistemological regress argument.
Then, we shall recall that there is a sense in which probabilistic infinite
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regresses of epistemic justification satisfy a minimal requirement
of coherence, viz. probabilistic consistency, so that an attempt at
blending infinitism and coherentism in a probabilistic setting is
not automatically doomed to failure. We will also see, however,
that a certain common characteristic of pronounced infinitist and
foundationalist positions, viz. the Principle of Inferential Justification,
is actually untenable in a probabilistic setting. We conclude that
those versions of infinitism and foundationalism which are built on
the Principle Inferential Justification (for short: strong infinitism and
strong foundationalism) should be rejected. Positively, we describe the
outlines of a formal graded coherence notion for conditional degrees
of beliefs (understood as conditional probability assignments, inducing
sets of probability measures) and show that certain infinite regresses of
epistemic justification do possess a reasonable degree of coherence.
In brief, this article will furnish a formal argument that there is (i)
a positive common ground between coherentism and mild versions of
infinitism — beyond the mere opposition to foundationalism — and (ii)
good reasons to set one’s epistemological stakes there. This may come
as a surprise, since Peter Klein co-authored formal papers attacking
coherentism (with Warfield [38, 39]) not long before setting out to
publish his well-known papers reviving infinitism (e.g. [33, 34, 35]).
But one may read Klein and Warfield [38, 39] as merely criticising a
certain non-essential way of formalising coherentism, not the positive
core tenets of coherentism itself.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we
review the classical threefold classification of accounts of epistemic
justification — foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism — and
explore possibilities of reconciliation. In Section 4, we set up a
formal framework in which we can analyse the probabilistic consistency
of belief systems in general and of infinite regresses of probabilistic
justification (for short: probabilistic infinite regresses) in particular.
In Section 5, we shall review recent findings about the probabilistic
consistency of infinite regresses. In Sections 6 and 7, we shall argue that
a consistent probabilistic regress of reasons, be it finite or infinite, may
not in itself provide epistemic justification; the Principle of Inferential
Justification has bizarre consequences, formally resembling the Sorites
paradox, in a probabilistic framework. We conclude (in Section 8) that
the Principle of Inferential Justification should be abandoned. Finally,
we propose to return to the search for a coherence theory of epistemic
justification — one in which some aspects of infinitism can be retained.
In Section 9, we sketch the basics of a graded coherence notion that
formalises BonJour’s [6] account of coherence. Section 10 concludes.
In the choice of our formal framework, we follow many
contemporary epistemologists (including infinitists such as Peijnenburg
and Atkinson [51]) in adopting probabilism (‘Bayesianism’), i.e. the
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view that doxastic states are graded and have the formal properties of
probability assignments.
2. Foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism as responses
to the regress problem
A classical argument for foundationalism based on the
epistemological regress problem is commonly attributed to Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics (Book I, Part 3). Whether Aristotle actually
intended his reasoning to be understood as a defence of epistemological
foundationalism (against Plato) or rather of a certain method of
instruction is a historical, exegetical question — which depends on the
interpretation of the term “demonstration” (po´deixic) in Aristotle’s
Organon — to which variant responses have been offered (cf. Irwin
[30, p. 139] or Rescher [57, p. 702] for the former view and Barnes
[4, p. 138] for the latter; Stump [62] offers a more detailed account
of the rise of foundationalism through a certain reading of Aquinas
and Aristotle). The present paper, however, has a ‘systematic’ rather
than ‘historical’ concern. We shall therefore henceforth ignore the
historical question of Aristotle exegesis and confine ourselves to a
discussion of some aspects of the argument for foundationalism that
one obtains when following the epistemological interpretation of
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.
The epistemological regress argument can be formally reconstructed
as follows (with propositional justification replaced by doxastic
justification). The first and pivotal step is to note that the following
set of premises is inconsistent:1
(1) [‘All justified beliefs are based on a non-repeating chain of
reasons (of length zero in the case of immediate justification).’]
If a subject2 I is justified in believing a proposition S0, then
there exists a sequence 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉 of other propositions (of
zero, finite non-zero or infinite length) such that
(a) for all k > 0, I is justified in believing Sk , and Sk 6= S0.3
(b) for all k, Sk+1 is a reason for Sk, and
(c) if 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉 is of finite length (say n), then it is maximal
in the sense that there is no proposition S ′ such that I
justifiedly believes S ′ and S ′ is a reason for Sn.
1 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out several weaknesses
in an earlier version of this section and the following one; any remaining errors are
mine.
2 Mnemonics: The letter I abbreviates ‘individual’; S abbreviates ‘sentence’.
3 The second half of this requirement is, strictly speaking, redundant — because
we have already demanded S1, S2, . . . to be propositions other than S0 — and has
only been inserted for clarification.
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Such a sequence 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉 is called a chain of reasons for
S0, and I is said to be justified in believing S0 on the basis of
the chain of reasons 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉.
(2) [‘If there are justified beliefs, then at least some of them are
based on finitely many reasons.’] If there are a subject I′ and
a proposition S ′0 such that I′ is justified in believing S ′0, then
there also is a subject I and a proposition S0 such that I is
justified in believing S0 on the basis of a finite chain of reasons.
(3) [‘There are justified beliefs.’] There exists a subject I and a
proposition S0 such that I is justified in believing S0.
(4) [‘There are no immediately justified beliefs.’] There is no
subject I and no proposition S0 such that I would be justified
in believing S0 on the basis of a chain of reasons of length zero.
The circumscription of Premise 1 is correct, because even though the
Premise prima facie only requires S1, S2, . . . to be distinct from S0
(second half of part 1a), its iteration implies that S0, S1, . . . are all
(pairwise) distinct.
The inconsistency proof for these premises is straightforward:
Proof of the inconsistency of Premises 1, 2, 3, 4.
Premise 3 and Premise 1 imply that there is some subject I and a
proposition S0 such that I is justified in believing S0 on the basis of
some chain of reasons 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉. By Premise 2, I and S0 may be
chosen in such a way that 〈S1, S2, . . . 〉 is finite, say of length n.
Then, on the one hand, I is justified in believing Sn. Hence there
must be, by Premise 1, a chain of reasons for Sn. Now, suppose that
this chain of reasons were not of length zero. Then, concatenating
〈S1, S2, . . . 〉 with this new chain of reasons would yield a new, longer
chain of reasons for S0 — which would contradict the maximality
requirement (part 1c) of Premise 1. Thus, we have found an individual
I and a proposition Sn such that I believes Sn on the basis of a
chain of reasons of length zero. This, however, directly contradicts
Premise 4. 
For illustration, first consider a simple example of circular
reasoning. Suppose a subject I has just two beliefs, S0 and S1, and
she reports that S1 is her reason for belief in S0, and S0 is her reason
for belief in S1. Now, on the one hand, the one-entry sequence 〈S1〉
is clearly not a chain of reasons (because I has a reason for believing
S1, viz. S0, whence the maximality clause 1c of Premise 1 denies 〈S1〉
the status of a chain of reasons). On the other hand, no sequence in
which S0 occurs can be a chain of reasons for S0 because this would
violate the requirement that the proposition to be justified may not be
adduced as a reason for itself (second half of clause 1a of Premise 1,
ruling out petitio principii). By the same argument, S1 may not be a
reason for itself, so that the demand of part 1b of Premise 1 cannot be
INFINITE REGRESSES AND COHERENCE 7
met by any sequence that consists of repeated entries of S1 only and
has length greater than one. Hence, Premise 1 actually denies that the
subject in question has any justified beliefs at all.
Next, consider an example of infinitist justification. Suppose that
a subject I′ believes proposition S0 and reports another proposition,
S1, as a reason for S0, yet another reason, S2, for S1 etc. ad infinitum.
Then Premise 1 is clearly satisfied, and there is no contradiction to the
other Premises, even though Premise 2 requires that not all cases of
justified belief have this form (hence the inconsistency of the Premises).
Finally, let us look at an example of foundationalist justification.
Reconsider subject I from above with her two beliefs, S0 and S1, and
suppose now that she reports that S1 is her reason for belief in S0, and
that her chain of reasons for S1 is the sequence of length zero. This
scenario satisfies Premise 1 but directly contradicts Premise 4.
Let us call the problem posed by the inconsistency of those
prima facie not entirely implausible premises the regress problem.
The foundationalist claims (with Aristotle) that all premises except
Premise 4 are self-evident. The conclusion is that Premise 4 is actually
false. Therefore, immediately justified (foundational) beliefs do exist.
This reasoning can, however, be turned into an argument for
skepticism by claiming that it is in fact not Premise 4, but Premise 3,
which is dubious and therefore should be jettisoned. Equally, if one can
make the case that the most questionable assumption is Premise 2, one
obtains an argument for infinitism. Finally, one can attack Premise 1
as the most problematic; this yields an — even though rather artificial
— argument for coherentism.
In this vein, the three classical non-skeptical epistemological
positions — foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism — can be
introduced as rival responses to the problem of regresses of epistemic
justification (as, for instance, in Klein [37] or Kvanvig [40]). There can
thus be no question of reconciling any two of those positions.
However, especially in light of the somewhat artificial coherentist
response to the regress problem, it is perhaps more plausible to
say that these three positions come from fundamentally different
intuitions about the very structure of epistemic justification — whether
justification is a property of beliefs or belief systems and, if the former,
whether there are foundational beliefs (that is, beliefs which are non-
inferentially or immediately justified).
3. Structural origins, weakenings and mutual compatibility
of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism
In this section, we (i) show how the germs of foundationalism,
infinitism and coherentism can already be found in certain fundamental
views about the structure of epistemic justification, (ii) distinguish
weaker and stronger versions of foundationalism, infinitism and
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coherentism, and explore the compatibility of weaker positions of
foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism, (iii) formulate weak
versions of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism that treat
epistemic justification as a matter of degree.
3.1. Germs of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism.
We can distinguish two basic and common intuitions about epistemic
justification (without claiming to be exhaustive of all possibilities): On
the one hand, one can view epistemic justification as a purely “local”
relation, as it were, so that a single proposition is either immediately
justified by recourse to another single proposition. A variant of this
position is to assent to a “local” character of epistemic justification
in this sense, but to deny the possibility of immediate epistemic
justification. On the other hand, there is some prima facie plausibility
in viewing epistemic justification holistically, i.e. as a “global” property
— a property which pertains to whole sets of propositions.
One can summarise these basic intuitions in the following theses:
(Strong pre-Foundationalism) A subject I is
justified in believing a proposition S0 if and only if S0
is either foundational or I believes another proposition
S1 such that S1 is a reason for S0 and I is justified in
believing S1.
(Strong pre-Infinitism) A subject I is justified in
believing a proposition S0 if and only if I believes
another proposition S1 such that S1 is a reason for S0
and I is justified in believing S1.
(Strong pre-Coherentism) A subject I is justified
in believing a proposition if and only if it belongs
to a set S of propositions such that I believes all
propositions in S and I is justified in believing S as a
whole.
Several observations are in order. First, it is common to view
“S1 is a reason for S0” as synonymous with “S0 can be inferred from
S0”, which allows for a re-formulation of the positions of Strong pre-
Foundationalism and Strong pre-Infinitism. It then becomes clear
that Strong pre-Infinitism and Strong pre-Foundationalism share an
important common feature in assigning a pivotal rôle to inferential
justification, but differ as to whether all justification is inferential. An
alternative which downplays the rôle of inferential justification would
be to replace “S1 is a reason for S0” by “S1 is held as a belief in virtue
of S0”; this, however, comes at the cost of having to explicate what it
means to assert to one proposition in virtue of another.
Second, the above theses of Strong pre-Infinitism and Strong
pre-Foundationalism, even when thus reformulated, cannot be used
immediately as definitions of what it means for a subject to be justified
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in believing a proposition, because the predicate ‘justified’ occurs
both in the definiens and the definiendum. Third, Strong pre-
Foundationalism reduces to Strong pre-Infinitism if one denies that
there are any foundational propositions at all.
Strong pre-Infinitism, when reformulated as indicated above
(replacing “S1 is a reason for S0” by “S0 can be inferred from S0”),
naturally — by iteration — gives rise to a strong version of infinitism:
(Strong Infinitism) A subject I is justified in
believing a proposition S0 if and only if I believes
other propositions S0, S1, S2, . . . (ad infinitum), is
justified in believing each of S1, S2, S3, . . . and for
all k, Sk can be inferred from Sk+1.
In fact, Strong Infinitism is logically equivalent to Strong pre-
Infinitism: Strong Infinitism obviously implies Strong pre-Infinitism,
and the latter implies the former by a straightforward iteration.
Foundationalists would typically not merely assert to Strong pre-
Foundationalism, but would also want to assert that the structure of
reasons is a well-ordering, so that any set that is ordered by the relation
“is a reason for” has a minimal and thus foundational element.
(Strong Foundationalism) A subject I is justified
in believing a proposition S0 if and only if S0 is either
foundational or I believes some other propositions
S1, . . . , Sn (n being a non-negative — and, to be sure,
finite — integer), is justified in believing each of them
and for all k < n, Sk can be inferred from Sk+1 while
Sn is foundational.
The additional requirement — the demand that the reasons be
well-ordered — is indispensable for deriving Strong Foundationalism
from Strong pre-Foundationalism. The reason is that Strong
Foundationalism and Strong pre-Foundationalism are not equivalent,
although clearly the former implies the latter. In order to see
that Strong Foundationalism cannot follow logically (without further
hypotheses) from Strong pre-Foundationalism, note that Strong pre-
Foundationalism does not demand that the set of foundational
propositions be non-empty; Strong Foundationalism, however, asserts
the existence of foundational propositions — and thereby contradicts
Strong Infinitism — whenever there are any justified propositions.
(In fact, if there are no foundational propositions, then Strong pre-
Foundationalism is equivalent to Strong pre-Infinitism and thus to
Strong Infinitism.)
But even Strong Foundationalism and Strong Infinitism cannot be
used to define epistemic justification because the predicate ‘justified’
appears on both sides of the equivalence statements constituting those
theses. For example, the position that a subject is epistemically
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justified in believing all propositions is consistent with Strong pre-
Foundationalism, Strong pre-Infinitism and Strong Infinitism; if the
subject in question believes all propositions including contradictions
she may always point to any contradiction as a — possibly even
foundational — “reason” due to the ex falso quodlibet. Also, the position
that a subject is only epistemically justified in believing tautologies
is consistent with Strong (pre-) Infinitism as well as with Strong
Foundationalism, as long as only tautologies are deemed foundational.
(For the compatibility with Strong pre-Infinitism and Strong Infinitism,
note that there are infinitely many tautologies.)
3.2. Weaker versions of foundationalism, infinitism and
coherentism. Their mutual compatibility. A version of infinitism
that is slightly weaker than those presented so far can be obtained by
dropping one half of the equivalence statement in the thesis of Strong
Infinitism. A particularly cautious treatment of epistemic justification
(which is true to Peter Klein’s anti-dogmatist intentions) will retain
the “only if” part:
(Weak Infinitism) A subject I is justified in
believing a proposition S0 only if I believes other
propositions S0, S1, S2, . . . (ad infinitum), is justified
in believing each of S1, S2, S3, . . . and for all k, Sk
can be inferred from Sk+1.
The definition of Strong pre-Coherentism can be used as a definition
of justification of individual beliefs, at the cost of having to specify
what justification of belief systems amounts to. As the name suggests,
Coherentism understands this chiefly as a matter of coherence. In order
to avoid having to call mere internal fiction epistemically justified,
strong coherentists need to modify their position by requiring of
epistemically justified belief systems that they be non-isolated, i.e. that
they accommodate at least some external input. (Cf. e.g. BonJour [6]
or the irenic, “ecumenical” treatment in Lehrer [41]). For a weaker
version of coherentism — one which drops the “if” part in the thesis of
Strong Coherentism (“necessity coherentism”, cf. e.g. Murphy [47]) —
this modification is not needed:
(Strong Coherentism) A subject I is justified in
believing a proposition if and only if it belongs to a set
S of propositions such that I believes all propositions
in S and S is coherent and non-isolated.
(Weak Coherentism) A subject I is justified in
believing a proposition only if it belongs to a set S
of propositions such that I believes all propositions in
S and S is coherent.
On such an account, Weak Infinitism and Weak Coherentism are
no longer mutually exclusive. This should not come as too much of a
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surprise because infinitism and coherentism share a common intuition
— in addition to their opposition to foundationalism: Both positions
tend to make the epistemic justification of individual propositions
dependent on the epistemic justification of very large sets of other
propositions. In infinitism, this is an obvious consequence of the infinite
regress-like structure of epistemic justification assumed therein. But
coherentism, too, is arguably strongest when used to describe the
epistemic justification of very large belief systems (sometimes called
“holistic varieties” of coherentism, e.g. in Kvanvig [40]).
3.3. Foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism for
graded epistemic justification. If epistemic justification is a matter
of degree, as many epistemologists think, cf. e.g. Roderick M. Chisholm
[12] or Peter Klein [35, p. 138], a further modification is necessary. One
then arrives at the following positions:
(Weak Graded Foundationalism) The degree to
which a subject I is justified in believing a proposition
S0 is, ceteris paribus, increased by the extent to which
I believes and is justified in believing some other
propositions S1, . . . , Sn (n being a non-negative —
and, to be sure, finite — integer) such that for all
k < n, Sk can be inferred from Sk+1 while Sn is
foundational; it is also increased by the strength of
those inferences.
(Weak Graded Infinitism) The degree to which
a subject I is justified in believing a proposition S0
is, ceteris paribus, increased by the extent to which I
believes and is justified in believing other propositions
S0, S1, S2, . . . (ad infinitum) such that for all k, Sk
can be inferred from Sk+1; it is also increased by the
strength of those inferences.
(Weak Graded Coherentism) The degree to which
a subject I is justified in believing a proposition S0
is proportional to the maximal degree of coherence
of sets S of propositions which I believes and which
contain S0.
Weak Graded Foundationalism can be seen as a version of Audi’s [3]
“mild foundationalism”, and Weak Graded Coherentism is essentially
what BonJour [6] defended; they are actually consistent with each
other as Audi [3] himself remarked. Furthermore, in light of concern
for holism — entailing an interest in very large belief systems —
exhibited by many coherentists, it is natural to try to wedWeak Graded
Coherentism and Weak Graded Infinitism. Indeed, the objective in
our formal analysis is to refute Strong Foundationalism and Strong
Infinitism, while at the same time showing the consistency of Weak
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(Graded) Coherentism and Weak (Graded) Infinitism. One step
towards this goal has already been reached in this section by showing
that Weak Coherentism and Weak Infinitism are compatible.
4. A formal probabilistic framework for analysing belief
systems and their epistemic justification
We shall now turn to a formal analysis of infinite belief systems
(including regresses), inferential justification and (to some extent)
coherence. We shall allow for partial beliefs and adopt the thesis
of probabilism — thus formalising degrees of beliefs as probabilities.
There is an ongoing, very lively and advanced discussion in formal
epistemology about the optimal ways of defending probabilism, cf.
e.g. Joyce [32], Easwaran and Fitelson [16], Fitelson and McCarthy
[18], Leitgeb and Pettigrew [42, 43], Wedgwood [63]; reviewing this
discussion would be way beyond the scope of this paper.
We choose, within these confines, a relatively simple and natural
framework, which bears some resemblance to the approach in Carnap
[11]. For our purposes in this note, a belief system S will simply be a set
of conditional probability assignments, interpreted as degrees of belief.
In other words, we fix some algebra A of propositions, and we shall
call a belief system a set of triples, denoted 〈A|B‖α〉, where A,B ∈ A
and the third and last entry α is a real number between 0 and 1, i.e.
α ∈ [0, 1]. The expression 〈A|B‖α〉 is to be read as “the belief system
assigns to A, given B, a conditional degree of belief α”.
We adopt a semantic notion of probabilistic consistency. We call a
belief system S probabilistically consistent if and only if there exists a
probability measure P : A → [0, 1] such that P (A|B) = α whenever
〈A|B‖α〉 ∈ S for any A,B ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1]. Such a probability
measure P is then said to support S or to be compatible with S. The
set of all probability measures on A that support a given belief system
S will be denoted PS.
A (recipe for a) probabilistic regress is a pair consisting of two
sequences α, β ∈ [0, 1]N (N denoting the set of nonnegative integers),
such that αk > βk for all k ∈ N. The consistency notion for (recipes for)
probabilistic regresses is then simply inherited from the probabilistic
consistency notion for belief systems: A recipe for a probabilistic
regress 〈α, β〉 is called consistent if and only if there exists a sequence
of propositions S = 〈Sk〉k∈N ∈ AN such that
{〈Sk|Sk+1‖αk〉 : k ∈ N} ∪
{〈
Sk|{Sk+1‖βk
〉
: k ∈ N}
is a probabilistically consistent belief system. (Herein, { denotes
the set-theoretic complement operator, so that {A denotes the
proposition/event ‘non-A’.) In other words, a probabilistic regress is
consistent if and only if there exist both a sequence S = 〈Sk〉k∈N ∈ AN
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and a probability measure P : A→ [0, 1] such that both
0 < P (Sk+1) < 1
and
P (Sk|Sk+1) = αk > βk = P (Sk|{Sk+1)
hold for all k ∈ N; such a pair 〈P, S〉 will be called a model for
the probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉. This entails that, in the terminology
of Bayesian epistemology (cf. e.g. Hájek and Hartmann [23]), Sk+1
confirms Sk for all k ∈ N — so that S0 is confirmed by S1, which is
confirmed by S2, which is confirmed by S3 etc. ad infinitum.4
5. In defense of (weak) infinitism: The consistency of
infinite probabilistic regresses
A recently established consistency theorem (Herzberg [27, 28])
asserts that a recipe for a probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is consistent if
and only if it is admissible in the sense that either
• ∏∞k=0(αk − βk) > 0, or
• (1) βk > 0 for infinitely many k, and
(2)
∑∞
`=0 β`+k
∏`−1
i=0(αi+k − βi+k) < 1 for all k ∈ N.
This condition looks unnatural only at first sight. In fact, as
Herzberg [27] shows, any violation of admissibility by a regress 〈α, β〉
immediately would entail the following: If S ∈ AN and P are such
that P (Sk|Sk+1) = αk and βk = P (Sk|{Sk+1), then also P (Sk) = 0
or P (Sk) = 1 for some k ∈ N \ {0}, whence either P (Sk|Sk+1) or
P (Sk|{Sk+1) are no longer defined — and 〈P, S〉 cannot be a model of
〈α, β〉.
Hence, this theorem establishes that there is a rich class of
probabilistic regresses that are consistent. Moreover, if 〈P, S〉 is a
model of 〈α, β〉, then P (S0) = 0. This directly and formally refutes
the two arguments against probabilistic infinitism that originate with
Russell [59], who thought that P (S0) = 0 must hold for all probabilistic
infinite regresses,5 and C.I. Lewis [44], who held probabilistic infinite
regresses to be probabilistically inconsistent:
“[I]n the kind of case here in point, one is always on
the wrong end of any segment of the series, always
required to determine something else first before
one can determine what one wants to determine.
The supposition that the probability of anything
4In Peijnenburg’s [50] or Peijnenburg and Atkinson’s [51] terminology,
confirmation is referred to as probabilistic support. Since this is not the standard
Bayesian terminology and we use the verb ‘to support’ also in a different formal
sense (viz. when referring to the set of probability measures supporting a belief
system), we have chosen not to follow Peijnenburg’s example on this minor point.
5He was corrected by Reichenbach in a private letter and admitted his error,
as explained by Peijnenburg and Atkinson [51, p. 338].
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whatever always depends on something else which
is only probable itself, is flatly incompatible with the
justifiable assignment of any probability at all.” [44,
p. 173] (emphasis inserted by this author)
(For a discussion of some historical aspects of infinitism, cf. Peijnenburg
and Atkinson [51, 52].) In addition, the said consistency theorem can
be used to counter more recent arguments to infinitism as well (cf.
Herzberg [28]).
Thus, we may conclude that the well-known and historical
arguments against infinite regresses of reasons fail; it is not so obvious
that infinite regresses could not constitute epistemic justification. A
quick dismissal of infinitism will not do. But what about the other
extreme: Are there examples of regresses of reasons which clearly do
not provide epistemic justification?
We shall now argue that not every probabilistic regress of reasons
provides epistemic justification for the proposition that was the point of
depart of the regress — even if it terminates (i.e. consists only of finitely
many reasons)! To see this, we need to review the foundationalist
Principle of Inferential Justification and how it is typically understood
in a probabilistic setting (within the existing literature).
This probabilistic setting is, in principle, open to several
interpretations, including both subjective and objective (such as
evidential) Bayesian ones. In order to allow for variant interpretations
of probability, we shall in the following not explicitly refer to the
(conditional) probabilities as (conditional) degrees of belief. That
being said, our intended interpretation is subjective Bayesian, in the
sense that we like to think of the (conditional) probabilities below as
(conditional) degrees of belief. In such a subjective Bayesian setting,
believing an inequality involving conditional probabilities — as in the
principles (BPIJ), (QBPIJ), (RPBIJ) below — is interpreted as having
conditional degrees of belief that satisfy the respective inequalities.
6. Common ground between strong foundationalism and
strong infinitism: The Principle of Inferential Justification
The Principle of Inferential Justification is usually rendered as
follows (cf. Fumerton [20, 21] who employs a slightly different
notation):
(PIJ) To be justified in believing E on the basis of F
one must not only be (1) justified in believing F , but
also (2) justified in believing that F makes probable
E.
By the Principle of Inferential Justification as a necessary and
sufficient condition we mean the following assertion:
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(PIJ’) One is justified in believing E on the basis of
F if and only if one is (1) justified in believing F and
(2) justified in believing that F makes probable E.
To be sure, in order to defend a version of foundationalism using a
regress argument, one only needs (PIJ), i.e. the “only if” part of (PIJ’)
(cf. e.g. Fumerton [21] for a succinct presentation of the connection
between the regress problem and PIJ). This caveat notwithstanding, if
one aims at a fully-fledged theory of epistemic justification, one needs a
sufficient condition as well — and for a staunchly inferentialist theory of
epistemic justification (be it of foundationalist or infinitist stripe), the
simplest candidate for such a principle would clearly be (PIJ’). Since
we aim at setting up strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism
for a dilemma, we will henceforth work with (PIJ’).
Moreover, a prima facie natural interpretation of “F makes
probable E” would be “F confirms E” in the sense of Bayesian
confirmation theory (which perhaps more accurately should be called
“Carnapian confirmation theory”, as its modern roots are to be found in
Carnap’s Logical foundations of probability [10], cf. Maher [46]). Under
this interpretation, (PIJ’) becomes the following Bayesian Principle of
Inferential Justification:
(BPIJ) One is justified in believing E on the basis of
F if and only if one is (1) justified in believing F and
(2) justified in believing that P (E|F ) > P (E).
The last inequality is, of course, equivalent to the formula P (E|F ) >
P (E|{F )6 which in the terminology of Peijnenburg [50] or Peijnenburg
and Atkinson [51, 52] is expressed as F probabilistically supports
E. The treatment of regresses of inferential justification in
Peijnenburg [50] as well as Peijnenburg and Atkinson [51, 52] suggests
that at least the necessity part of a principle like (BPIJ) is not seen as
extraordinarily controversial, neither by infinitists nor foundationalists
that subscribe to some kind of probabilism. It is therefore not
too far-fetched to suppose that strong foundationalists and infinitists
that accept probabilism will be adherents of a principle like (BPIJ).
Nevertheless, there are instances of (BPIJ) where the weight of support
which the reason lends to the proposition in question is, while not
zero, so meagre that it can hardly be said to afford “justification” for
6As a few elementary rearrangements show:
P (E|F ) > P (E|{F ) ⇔ P (E ∩ F )
P (F )
>
P (E \ F )
1− P (F )
⇔ P (E ∩ F )− P (E ∩ F )P (F ) > P (E \ F )P (F )
⇔ P (E ∩ F ) > P (E)P (F )⇔ P (E|F ) > P (E).
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believing that proposition.7 Still, in their latest paper, Peijnenburg
and Atkinson [53] clarify that they would only subscribe to the
necessity part of a principle like (BPIJ) — i.e. a probabilistic reading
of (PIJ) as opposed to (PIJ’) —, not the sufficiency part. Thus,
Peijnenburg and Atkinson [53] themselves are not susceptible to the
criticism above. Nevertheless, any strong, anti-coherentist infinitist
who (perhaps motivated by the surprising viability of infinite regresses
of justification demonstrated by Peijnenburg, Atkinson and Herzberg)
goes beyond Peijnenburg and Atkinson and accepts the sufficiency part
of (BPIJ) as well will have to respond to the above challenge.
In the opinion of this author, whether a proposition is epistemically
justified is actually a matter of degree rather than a binary decision.
But this cannot be granted by adherents of a literal reading of the
Principle of Inferential Justification.
A refuge for someone who wants to uphold the Principle
of Inferential Justification and give it an interpretation that
accommodates Bayesian confirmation theory might be the following
more quantitative version of the Bayesian Principle of Inferential
Justification:
(QBPIJ) One is justified in believing E on the basis of
F if and only if one is (1) justified in believing F and
(2) justified in believing that P (E|F )− P (E) ≥ c.
Herein, c denotes a threshold for partial justification to become full
justification — just like the Lockean thesis postulates a threshold for
partial belief to turn into full belief.8
One problem with (QBPIJ) lies in the indiscriminate use of the
same c for all candidate beliefs E, which means that it might turn
out to be very hard or even impossible under (QBPIJ) to justify
one’s belief in an event with a relatively high prior probability given
rigorous demands on what counts as confirmatory evidence. Suppose,
for instance, a proposition E has prior probability P (E) = .81 and we
employ (QBPIJ) with c = .2. Then, in order to justify our belief in
E, we would have to find a piece of confirmatory evidence such that
P (E|F ) = .81 + .2 > 1, which is impossible!
7 On this point, I am indebted to an anonymous referee, who suggested the
following example. Suppose there is a 1000 ticket lottery, F is the event that ticket
#1000 does not win, and E is the event that ticket #1 wins. Suppose you learn from
a reliable source that F is true, so you are justified in believing it, and condition
(1) in (BPIJ) is met. So is (2): P (E|F ) = 1/999 > 1/1000. But surely you are not
justified in believing E on the basis of F . In terms of Bayesian confirmation theory,
the degree of confirmation for E offered by F (according to the relevance measure
of confirmation) is minute, viz. just 1/999− 1/1000, which is of order 10−6.
8 A popular version of what is known as the Lockean thesis demands that in
order for a proposition S0 to be considered a full belief of an agent, that agent’s
degree of belief in S0 must exceed a certain threshold. Locke’s Essay contains several
passages that suffer such an interpretation [45, Book IV, Chapters XIV–XVII].
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Another natural and apparently more easily defensible
interpretation of the “F makes E probable” in Fumerton’s (PIJ)
and the stronger (PIJ’) is that P (E|F ), the subjective probability of
E given F , be sufficiently high:
(RBPIJ) One is justified in believing E on the basis
of F if and only if one is (1) justified in believing F
and (2) justified in believing that P (E|F ) ≥ c.
Regarding the use of the parameter c, (RBPIJ) is more closely related
to the Lockean thesis than (QBPIJ), because in both (RBPIJ) and
the Lockean thesis, c is simply a lower bound for the (conditional)
subjective probability of a candidate belief.
In Section 7, we shall point to some serious concerns about (BPIJ),
(QBPIJ) and (RBPIJ), and in Section 8, we will conclude that the
strong Principle of Inferential Justification should be abandoned in
a probabilistic setting. One might already wonder at this point
whether we have overlooked an important alternative probabilistic
Principle of Inferential Justification. For, in their aforementioned latest
paper, Peijnenburg and Atkinson [53] ultimately hint at the following
acceptance criterion in which only the necessity part of the Principle
of Inferential Justification enters (so that Peijnenburg and Atkinson
clearly distance themselves from the stronger (PIJ’) and its problematic
probabilistic formalisations (BPIJ), (QBPIJ) and (RBPIJ)):
(PBPIJ) One is justified in believing E0 on the basis
of E1 and E1 on the basis of E2 etc. ad infinitum if
and only if one is justified in believing P (Ek|Ek+1) >
P (Ek) for all k ∈ N and, in addition, P (E0) ≥ c.
This principle is immune to the criticism that we shall offer in
Section 7. However, the fundamental difference to (BPIJ), (QBPIJ)
and (RBPIJ) is that (PBIPJ) conjoins a probabilistic version of (PIJ)
(as opposed to (PIJ’)) with a global threshold constraint. The principle
(PBPIJ) therefore comes very close to an admission that epistemic
justification should rather be seen as a property of whole belief systems
than of individual beliefs. This, however, is already the first and
arguably decisive step towards coherentism — exactly the account
of epistemic justification that this paper seeks to revive in a new
formalisation.
In other words, (PBIPJ) is not a very strong, anti-coherentist
version of infinitism at all. What separates (PBPIJ) from the version
of coherentism outlined in Section 9 below is (A) (PBPIJ)’s binary
understanding of epistemic justification, (B) (PBPIJ)’s presupposition
of a unique subjective probability measure, and (C) (PBPIJ)’s apparent
disregard for coherence consideration. Now, (B) does not indicate
a big divide, because one can easily generalise (PBPIJ) through
universal quantification over all P that are compatible with the belief
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system. Moreover, if (PBPIJ) is viewed as merely a rough, binary
approximation of a more fine-grained notion of epistemic justification,
(A) and (C) will not stand in the way of reconciling (PBPIJ) with the
formalisation of graded coherentism sketched in Section 9 below.
Thus, we shall henceforth treat (PBPIJ), as it were, as an ally rather
than a foe. For the remainder of the paper, we shall concentrate on a
proposal for a refutation of the principles (BPIJ), (QBPIJ), (RBPIJ)
and the subsequent elaboration of the main ingredients of a formal
graded coherence notion.
7. Problematic consequences of Bayesian variants of the
Principle of Inferential Justification
As we shall see presently, both foundationalist and infinitist
accounts of epistemic justification based on the Bayesian Principle
of Inferential Justification (BPIJ) face a serious conceptual difficulty:
Sufficiently long finite as well as infinitely long chains of probabilistic
justification may result in arbitrarily small probabilities for the
proposition that is to be justified. To see this, suppose we are given
propositions E0, . . . , En such that for all i < n, Ei+1 confirms Ei
and let us introduce the abbrevations αi := P (Ei|Ei+1) and βi :=
P (Ei|{Ei+1). Then, by iterating an appropriate instance of the law of
total probability,
(1) P (E0) = P (En)
n−1∏
i=0
(αi − βi) +
n−1∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
(αi − βi)
(cf. Peijnenburg and Atkinson [51, Equations (6)]). For the case of
constant αi, βi, Equation (1) reads:
P (E0) = P (En)(α− β)n +
n−1∑
`=0
β(α− β)`(2)
= P (En)(α− β)n + β 1− (α− β)
n
1− α + β
=
β
1− α + β +
(
P (En)− β
1− α + β
)
(α− β)n(3)
(cf. Peijnenburg [50, Equation (12)]), and in the case of an infinite
regress (i.e. n→∞), one has, of course,
P (E0) =
β
1− α + β(4)
(Peijnenburg [50, p. 601]). Therefore, keeping α < 1 fixed, one has
P (E0) −→ 0 as β → 0. For instance, in the example of the recent
paper by Peijnenburg and Atkinson [52, p. 119], P (E0) is as small as
.2. Thus, an infinitist who applies the sufficiency part of (BPIJ) must
claim that an epistemic subject is justified in believing a proposition to
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which she herself assigns a very small probability. This is very counter-
intuitive (and exhibits some formal similarity to the Sorites paradox).
Even though there has recently been an attempt to vindicate a position
that allows for justified belief in propositions to which a small credence
is assigned, this vindication only refers to certain, very special scenarios
(which may be seen as probabilistic analogues of Gettier examples).
The foundationalist who accepts the sufficiency part of (BPIJ) is
only in a slightly better position: Equation (3) teaches us that for
every fixed n and fixed α < 1, one has P (E0) −→ 0 as β → 0. This
holds regardless of the value of P (En). Even if En is a properly basic
belief and thus assigned a probability of exactly 1 and E0 has been
obtained by five successive inferences (from the properly basic belief
En), each of which was relatively robust, say, α = .6 and β = .2, then
P (E0) =
1
3
+ 2
3
× 32
3125
= 1
3
×(1 + 64
3125
)
< 1
2
. So, E0 will be less likely than
its negation; therefore, it is almost absurd to claim that E0 instead of
non-E0 is justified!
As was mentioned above, abandoning (BPIJ) for (RBPIJ) goes
against the consensus of the existing — rather small, as we readily
admit — literature on infinitism in a probabilistic setting. But be
this as it may, such a strategy would only be of little use to strong
foundationalists or strong infinitists, because anyone who subscribes
to (RBPIJ) rather than (BPIJ) faces a similar challenge to the one
outlined in the preceding paragraph: If E0 is made probable by E1,
which is made probable by E2, etc., and we interpret “F makes
E probable” according to (RBPIJ) as P (E|F ) ≥ c, then (RBPIJ)
teaches that a candidate belief E0 is justified if and only if there is
a chain of reasons E1, E2, . . . such that P (Ek|Ek+1) ≥ c for all k;
for a foundationalist, a chain of reasons ends by definition in some
immediately justified belief En, and for an infinitist, a chain of reasons
has to continue ad infinitum. In our previous notation, all that (RBPIJ)
demands is that αk = P (Ek|Ek+1) ≥ c for all k; nothing is said
about the sequence of conditional probabilities βk = P (Ek|{Ek+1). By
choosing a sequence of events with constant βk = β < 1 − c,9 we can
ensure, in light of the general Equation (4), that
P (E0) =
β
1− c+ β < 1/2,
so that any infinitist subscribing to (RBPIJ) must claim that belief
in propositions to which a subjective probability of less than 1/2 is
assigned is justified. And by choosing β < 1− c as well as a sufficiently
large n, we can even ensure, in light of Equation (3), that the same is
true for any foundationalist subscribing to (RBPIJ). Again, infinitists
and foundationalists who take (RBPIJ) at face value must claim that
9 The choice of such a sequence is possible in light of the consistency theorems
for infinite regresses, cf. Section 5.
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an agent is justified in believing some proposition E0 to which she
assigns subjective probability < 1/2; but clearly, such an agent is, if
anything, justified in believing the negation of that proposition!
8. A dilemma for Bayesian foundationalists and infinitists
In order to circumvent supporting the epistemic justification of
beliefs whose content is less likely than its negation, an infinitist or
foundationalist has, in principle, two options: She may either (a) reject
the Bayesian interpretations of “F makes probable E” in (BPIJ) and
(RBPIJ) or (b) take exception to the sufficiency part of either (BPIJ)
or (RBPIJ).
The former way looks very much like an ad hoc solution. For, if
neither Bayesian confirmation theory nor an adaptation of the Lockean
thesis give a satisfactory explanation of “F makes probable E”, what
does? Also, the Bayesian Principle of Inferential Justification (BIPJ)
can be motivated by probability logic: It is a p-valid conclusion — in
the sense of Adams’ probability logic — to conclude from a very high
probability for B given A (A ⇒ B in Adams’ notation) and a very
high probability for A that B must have a high probability (cf. Adams
[1, p. 157f.]) as well. For short, dropping the two proposed Bayesian
interpretations of “F makes probable E” does not seem to be, after all,
a satisfactory option.
What remains is the latter possibility — to jettison the “if” part
of (BPIJ) or (RBPIJ). This, however, is a rather thorny way out
of the problem, too: If the sufficiency part of (BPIJ) or (RBPIJ)
is incomplete, which additional conditions on the right-hand side of
the Principle of Inferential Justification would be needed to obtain
a sufficient criterion for inferential transfer of epistemic justification?
Notice that in order to exclude the above examples of pseudo-
justification, these conditions must be of such a form that they entail
quantitative lower bounds on β or (in the case of the foundationalist)
quantitative upper bounds on n. At least to this author, it is
totally enigmatic how general epistemological principles could provide
quantitative bounds of such a form. Furthermore, the appeal of the
Principle of Inferential Justification — at least for non-coherentists,
who conceive of epistemic justification as a property of individual
beliefs one at a time, not of entire belief systems at once — lies precisely
in the fact that it allows to transfer epistemic justification from one
proposition to the other without examining how the former proposition
was justified.
In sum, the Bayesian Principle of Inferential Justification, in both
its revised (RBPIJ) and unrevised (BIPJ) forms, is on the one hand
far too permissive as a necessary and sufficient criterion for epistemic
justification. On the other hand, if our analysis is correct, there is no
INFINITE REGRESSES AND COHERENCE 21
fix for this problem short of abandoning the Principle of Inferential
Justification.
Having criticised the Principle of Inferential Justification and (in
a previous section) foundationalist views of infinite regresses, the
remainder of this paper is more positive. We shall propose some
basic aspects of an alternative theory of epistemic justification along
coherentist lines which nevertheless can accommodate some features of
infinitism and even foundationalism.
9. Toward a solution: Reviving coherentism
So far, we have argued that the Principle of Inferential Justification
has, when applied in a probabilistic setting, highly undesirable
consequences. But is there an alternative?
For a coherentist, it has been clear from the beginning that the
structure of epistemic justification cannot be accurately captured by
the Principle of Inferential Justification. Epistemic justification is a
property not of individual beliefs, but of entire belief systems. And if
those belief systems are probabilistic, i.e. consist of conditional degrees
of beliefs, as outlined in the formal framework above, then a belief
will in general only be justified to a certain degree. Moreover, it is
quite evident that a holistic and gradual understanding of epistemic
justification is, at the very least, not totally foreign to epistemological
infinitism (cf. e.g. Klein [35, p. 138]).
The reader of this article may object that formal epistemology
of the last two decades, starting with the papers by Klein and
Warfield [38, 39], has buried any hopes for coherentism.10 However,
if belief systems are understood as thoroughly probabilistic (as in
our framework), it turns out that many of the arguments purporting
to show the impossibility of coherence measures, are no longer
tenable; for, this literature always criticises attempts of measuring
the coherence of a set of propositions (or of a binary assignment of
truth values to propositional variables), rather than the coherence of
a set of conditional degrees of belief (which, according to probabilism,
correspond to conditional probability assignments and thus induce sets
of probability measures). Moreover, even Bovens and Hartmann [8],
while noted for their impossibility theorem for real-valued coherence
measures, proposed a vector-valued coherence measure. It would
clearly exceed the confines of a short paper to elaborate a fully-fledged
coherence theory of epistemic justification, i.e. a theory which construes
10This may be all the more surprising since coherentism was, after all, the
position of eminent analytic epistemologists such as Goodman [22], Hempel [25,
26], Neurath [48, 49], Quine [54], Reichenbach [55] and Sellars [60] to name
but a few; among influential contemporary epistemologists, coherentism has had
adherents such as van Fraassen [19], and Jeffrey [31] at the very least shared their
opposition to foundationalism.
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a notion of coherence that is equivalent to epistemic justification.
Nevertheless, we may sketch some of the formal aspects of such a theory
(which is the subject of a monograph in preparation).
The following points have to be chiefly borne in mind: (i) Epistemic
justification is a matter of degree (cf. even according to philosophers
who reject coherentism such as, e.g., Roderick M. Chisholm [12]
or Peter Klein [35, p. 138]): a belief system may be more or less
epistemically justified. (ii) So is coherence: a belief system may be
more coherent or less coherent (cf. e.g. Brendel [9]). While these points
are widely appreciated, we also add the following: (iii) Because of its
holistic understanding of epistemic justification, coherentism should
primarily clarify what the degree of coherence of comprehensive belief
systems (e.g. entire worldviews) is; by only looking at comprehensive
belief systems, we may safely assume that the belief system under
consideration contains spontaneous cognitive beliefs (in BonJour’s [6,
Chapter 6] sense) and will thus not be isolated from the external world,
but responsive to input from outside.11
The aforementioned thesis of Weak Graded Coherentism — which
may very well be consistent with mild forms of foundationalisms such
as Robert Audi’s “moderate foundationalism” [3, p. 233] — could also
be formulated thus: If two belief systems S1, S2 make statements about
the same conditional events, then S1 is epistemically more justified than
S2 if S1 has a greater degree of coherence than S2. We shall now explain
cursorily what it means formally for a comprehensive belief system to
exhibit a greater degree of coherence than another comprehensive belief
system.
According to BonJour [6, Section 5.3], (1) any degree of coherence
can only be assigned to logically consistent belief systems, and
the degree of coherence depends isotonically on (2) its degree of
probabilistic consistency and (3) the number and strength of inferential
connections in it, and antitonically on (4) its fragmentation into
subsystems that are not mutually inferentially connected. He also
adds as a further requirement that (5) unexplained anomalies should
decrease the degree of coherence as “advisable”; this requirement seems,
however, beyond any hopes of being formalised, whence we shall ignore
this advice.
The other, and arguably much more essential, four requirements
can be formalised as follows: (1) The logical consistency of a belief
system is tantamount to the non-emptiness of the intersection of
the propositions/events in the belief system. (2) The probabilistic
consistency of a belief system can be measured in terms of the size of
the set of probability measures supporting a belief system. Since this
11Reichenbach already proposed a solution to the isolation objection along these
lines through the inclusion of “observation sentences” ([56, p. 159] and [55, p. 83])
or “protocol sentences” [44, p. 171].
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set will have a distinctive geometrical structure (viz. the intersection
of several hyperplanes with a simplex), there is a canonical way of
measuring its size through a vector-valued quantity, viz. the pair
consisting of the Hausdorff dimension and the Hausdorff measure [24].
(3) The number of inferential connections can be measured in terms of
graph-theoretic notions of connectivity; their strength can be measured
using a confirmation function. (4) The fragmentation can be measured
in terms of the number of components, i.e. maximal connected (proper)
subgraphs.
Using Robinsonian [58] nonstandard analysis (more precisely, the
Transfer Principle of nonstandard analysis), one can extend this real-
vector-valued coherence notion defined for finite belief systems to a
hyperreal-vector-valued coherence notion defined for hyperfinite belief
systems. Thus, one arrives at a coherence notion which is applicable
to certain infinite belief systems defined, too. This class of infinite
belief systems includes all belief systems on hyperfinite probability
spaces. Bearing in mind the universality of such spaces (as rigorously
formulated and established Fajardo and Keisler [17], building on earlier
work, especially by Hoover and Keisler [29]), this is already a very
substantial degree of generality.
This is, we think, a quite natural approach to a formalised coherence
theory of epistemic justification, even though it requires much further
explication. A more elaborate treatment will be presented in a
forthcoming paper. The bottomline is that such a theory can be greatly
simplified by confining the discussion (a) to comparative coherence
and comparative epistemic justification and (b) to the comparison of
comprehensive belief systems only.
Before the emergence of the literature on infinitism, one would have
considered part (b) to come at an enormous cost, viz. that infinite belief
systems must be considered as well — which may have a regress-like
structure. But now it is enough to point to refer to the discussion
on infinitism in order to dispel this objection. For instance, the
consistency theorem for infinite regresses of probabilistic justification
(see above and, in greater detail, Herzberg [27, 28]) provides us with
a large set of concrete examples of infinite belief systems which are
demonstrably probabilistically consistent. Moreover, an inspection of
the original proof of Herzberg’s [27] consistency theorem shows that
for any admissible probabilistic regress, there is a model 〈P, S〉 that
is also logically consistent in the sense that
⋂
n Sn 6= ∅.12 Thus we
12Herein, ∅ denotes the minimal element of the algebra A of propositions, viz.
the empty set when identifying each proposition in A with its extension, i.e. the set
of worlds in which it holds.
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have found a large set of infinite belief systems which demonstrably do
possess more than a minimal degree of coherence.13
Before concluding, let us briefly summarise what has been achieved
in this paper so far. We have shown in this paper, rigorously and
in a simple and natural Bayesian framework: (i) infinite regresses
generically constitute probabilistically consistent belief systems; (ii)
even though probabilistically consistent, both finite and infinite
regresses can fail to establish epistemic justification based on the
Principle of Inferential Justification; (iii) there is hope for a formal
coherence notion which assigns an important rôle to both (a)
probabilistic consistency and (b) to the presence and the strength of
inferential connections and which (c) can be adapted to be applicable to
infinite belief systems, too. We may therefore conclude that the theses
introduced as Weak Graded Coherentism and Weak Graded Infinitism
above are even jointly consistent, while both Strong Infinitism and
Strong Foundationalism are, at least in a Bayesian setting, very
problematic on account of their use of the Principle of Inferential
Justification. Moreover, our account of epistemic justification based on
a formalisation of BonJour’s [6] analysis of the concept of coherence can
also accommodate certain foundationalist intuitions: Belief systems
may, of course, include statements like 〈A|Ω‖α〉 for α arbitrarily close to
(or even equal to) 1,14 and there will normally be no lack of possibilities
to extend such a statement to a belief system with a high degree of
coherence (which for a coherentist entails a high degree of epistemic
justification).
Finally, our sketch of a formal coherentist account of epistemic
justification only involves degrees of coherence and thus of justification
— without any maximum or canonical threshold which could be used
to introduce a context-independent definition of knowledge. Therefore,
it is compatible even with very cautious approaches to epistemic
justification — which treat most instances of what is commonly held to
be epistemic justification as merely “provisional” (cf. Klein [36, p. 26])
or a mere “approximat[ion]” of epistemic justification (cf. lately even
BonJour [7, pp. 62, 76]).
10. Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to show that mild versions of coherentism
and infinitism can be — and should be — reconciled in order to arrive
at a convincing philosophical position regarding epistemic justification.
13It is interesting in this connection that de Finetti considered probabilistic
consistency to be such an important component of a coherence notion that he
simply [13, 14, 15] defined coherence as probabilistic consistency.
14Herein, Ω denotes the maximal element of the algebra A of propositions,
viz. the set of all possible worlds when identifying each proposition in A with its
extension (the set of worlds in which it holds).
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Our critique of the natural Bayesian variant of the Principle
of Inferential Justification demonstrates that the mere existence
of an infinite chain of probabilistic inferences is not enough to
provide epistemic justification. We argue that in order to avoid the
undesirable consequences of the Principle of Inferential Justification in
a probabilistic setting, infinitists should jettison that Principle and
instead look for a holistic, coherentist understanding of epistemic
justification. And indeed, there does exist some hope for formalising a
defensible notion of coherence that could serve as a starting point for
a revived holistic coherence theory of epistemic justification.
Moreover such a revived and revised version of coherentism can
— and for at least three reasons should — accommodate infinitist
intuitions as well. First, we have outlined an alternative way of
introducing foundationalism and infinitism (which is no longer based
on the epistemological regress argument) and shown that mild versions
of those positions are not genuine rivals after all. Secondly, infinite
regresses of probabilistic justification will often turn out to possess
more than a minimal degree of coherence, in light of their generic
probabilistic consistency. Thirdly, if coherentists take their holistic
commitment seriously, they need to accept very large, even infinite
belief systems.
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